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1997/Liability Limits Under the Warsaw Convention
L INTRODUCTION
The recent crash of TWA Flight 800 in New York has drawn public attention to
the United States laws that limit the recovery of damages in international airline
crashes. These laws can potentially limit the recovery available to the victim's
family members to US$75,000. The amount recoverable under these laws is far less
than the recovery found in domestic airline crashes, where the international agree-
ments and laws do not apply. For example, in the 1980s it was reported that the
average recovery for deaths related to international flights not subject to the Warsaw
Convention, which limited the liability of the air carrier, was US$750,000. To
further illustrate the inequity in recovery available under the agreements that govern
international airline crashes, the victim's families in the recent crash of the Korean
Air Lines 747 in Guam will be limited to about US$140,000. 4
This comment will discuss the International Air Transport Association's s (IATA)
Initiative and its impact on international air travel and the legal issues governing the
recovery of damages. The initiative marks a major change in the recovery available
to victims of airline crashes, and attempts to create clear international standards to
replace the patchwork of agreements and laws that exist outside of the agreement.6
1. See Crash Victins' Survivors Face Cap on Damage; Laws Could Limit Compensation to $75,000, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 22, 1996, at 5B (explaining that damages may be capped at $75,000 due to the laws);
see also Saundra Tony, Litigation a Difficult Recourse for the Families of Flight 800, WASH. POST, July 29, 1996,
at F07 (asserting that a treaty forms barriers to the hefty awards people envision in an airline disaster).
2. See Weekley v. Wings West, No. C-558,227 (CA. Super. Ct., L.A. County, June 1987) (discussing a
plaintiff verdict for $2,500,000 for compensatory damages where a 53 year old married male was killed when a
commuter plane collided with a private airplane and the defendant airline admitted liability); see also White v. Delta
Airlines, No. CA4-86-886-K MDL 657 (Jan. 1987) (discussing a plaintiff verdict for $1,130,000 for a 33 year old
male, with one minor child, who was killed in an airline crash at Dallas/Ft. Worth airport in August 1985); see also
Four Settlements Reached in Cases Arising from Airplane Crash; United Airlines Crash at Sioux City, Iowa,
VERDICTS, SETnLME S & TACTICS (West 1993) (discussing a $2,000,000 award for a flight attendant who was
killed, a $1,500,000 award for another passenger, and a $1,000,000 award for a boy who survived, but suffered
third-degree friction burns and a broken back, and a $300,000 settlement for a man who also survived but sustained
a bruised breastbone).
3. See Veronica M. Pastor, Absolute Liability Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention: Where Does
It Stop?, 26 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 575, 578 (citing Interview with Paul Larsen, Office of General
Counsel, U.S. Department of Transportation, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 27, 1991)).
4. See Harvey Elliott, Compensation Lottery Chaos, TIETIMiEs, Aug. 14, 19.97 (explaining the limitations
of recovery available to the victims).
5. See LAURENCE E. Gasm i, AVIATION AND THE LAW XV-5 (1989) (discussing the history of IATA).
Thirty-one countries met in Havana to form an international association to replace IATA's predecessor, the
International Air Traffic Association which was formed in 1919 to standardize tickets and airway bills. Id. The
principal purpose of IATA, when it was formed, was promotion of safe, regular, and economic air transportation.
Id. Today, IATA's principal function is the economic regulation of international air transportation. Id.
6. See Lee S. Kreindler, Goodbye to Liability Limitations, 217 N.Y.L.J. 33 (1997) (asserting that a
monumental revolution has occurred in which liability limits have been discarded for future international aviation
accidents).
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Simply stated, the initiative eliminates liability limits for plaintiffs suing an air carrier
to recover damages incurred in an accident during international service.7
To fully understand the magnitude of the change it is important to first under-
stand the old rules governing the liability of international airline accidents. Part II of
this Comment will explore the background of the Warsaw Convention and some of
its basic provisions, most of which still exist despite the new agreements. The
various aspects of liability for international air carriers under the Warsaw Convention
will be discussed in Part I. Part IV will then discuss the recent developments that
have brought about a drastic change in the liability of air carriers who are signatories
of the recent IATA Initiative. An analysis of the changes to the Warsaw Convention
brought about by the IATA Initiative will be offered in Part V, as well as the legal
issues raised by the new agreement.
II. BACKGROUND
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air (Warsaw Convention)8 governs many areas of international air
travel for the more than 120 signatory nations 9 This international treaty impacts the
laws of the signatory countries in different ways. 10 Several countries have enacted the
convention into domestic law.1'
7. S.e id. (discussing the elimination of liability limits that have ranged from USS8,300, to US$10,000,
and since 1966 US$75,000). Mr. Kreindler states the aviation lawyers should be proud of discarding the liability
limits. Id.
8. See generally Laurie M. McQuade, Tragedy as a Catalyst for Reform: the Anerican Way?, 11 CONN.
J. INr'L L. 325, 327 (1996) (explaining that the convention was held in the city of Warsaw, Poland in 1929, thus
it is called the Warsaw Convention). In the United States the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution makes
treaties part of the law of the land; thus the Warsaw Convention is the supreme law of the U.S. and takes precedence
over iny conflicting state or federal laws. Id.
9. See Kelly C. Grems, Punitive Damages Under the Warsaw Convention: Revisiting the Drafters' Intent,
41 AM. U. L. REv. 141 (1991) (discussing the Warsaw Convention and its provisions).
10. See McQuade, supra note 8 (discussing the impact of the Warsaw Convention on the signatory nation).
11. See id. (stating that some of these countries include France, England, Israel, Australia, and Canada); see
id. (explaining that in the United States the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution makes international treaties
part of the law of the U.S., taking precedence over state laws).
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A. History and Purpose of The Warsaw Convention
In 1929, an international convention was held in Warsaw to establish uniform
rules relating to international air carriage documents' 2 and liability.13 This was the
second of two international conferences addressing international air carrier regu-
lation.14 From this conference came the "Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air," better known as the Warsaw
Convention.' 5 President Roosevelt ratified the Warsaw Convention for the United
States with the consent of the Senate in 1934.16 The Warsaw Convention formed the
basic rules of air carrier accident liability for injury or death to passengers sustained
while embarking, on board, and disembarking the aircraft, 7 as well as damage or loss
of baggage or goods during transportation by air.'8 The purpose of the convention
was not to eliminate all differences between the substantive law of each of the
parties, but to establish certain uniform rules relating to international air travel. 19 The
Warsaw Convention arose out of the need to provide a uniform system of law
applicable to all international air accidents.2' Because international air travel involves
flying over and into numerous states and countries, many different state, federal and
foreign laws are involved in potential air disasters. 2' The Warsaw Convention
provided uniform rules to apply to airline accidents, thus eliminating some of the
uncertainty in the law governing an international air crash.
12. See GESELL, supra note 5, at XV-I (explaining that air carriage documents discussed at the Warsaw
Convention consisted of passenger tickets and air cargo waybills); see also BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1593 (6th
ed. 1990) (defining waybill as a written document used in shipping goods made out by the carrier listing the origin
and destination, consignor and consignee, and a description of the shipment, and detailing the costs of the
transportation of the shipment). The written document is used for claims against the carder for items lost or
damaged during shipment. Id.
13. See id. (discussing the Warsaw Convention's origin and its history); see id. (explaining the rules relating
to documents as developing uniform standards for passenger tickets and for air cargo waybills in international travel
and shipping).
14. See Grems, supra note 9, at 142 (stating the first international airline conference was held in Paris in
1925, and during this conference an interim committee named the Comite Internationale Technique d'Experts
Juridique Aeriens was established to prepare the draft document for the 1929 Convention in Warsaw).
15. 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter WARSAwCoNVENTIoN].
16.' See Monroe Leigh, Treaties-Warsaw Convention Preempts California Law Regarding Jimitation of
Liability-Constituionality of Warsaw Convention, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 153 (1983) (explaining how the Warsaw
Convention was ratified by the United States).
17. WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 15, art. 17.
18. See id art. 18 (establishing liability for loss or damage to goods or baggage); see also GEsEn.u, supra
note 12, at XV-1 (explaining the purpose of the Warsaw Convention).
19. See Grems, supra note 9, at 142 (explaining the parties did not intend to eliminate all differcnces in
common law and civil law countries, and in order to facilitate acceptance of the convention left some issues such
as damages, and civil procedure to local law).
20. Pastor, supra note 3, at 576.
21. Alois V. Gross, Annotation, Limitation of Liability of Air-Carrier For Personal Injury or Death, 91
A.L.R. FED. 547, at lb (1996) (explaining the need for a unified system of accident law).
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The Warsaw Convention also provided a uniform standard for international
transportation documents, and set forth the basic requirements of international pas-
senger tickets.2 Additionally, it established the requirement for a baggage check on
international air carriage, and the standards for air carriage of goods by requiring an
air waybill.23 The Warsaw Convention also established air carrier liability for damage
caused by delay in the transportation of passengers, baggage, or goods.24
The Warsaw Convention occurred when the aviation industry was a mere
infant.25 The international aviation industry needed the convention to provide a uni-
form system of law applicable to aircraft accidents, and to protect the young fragile
industry from the potential of high damage awards from a crash by limiting
liability.26 The aviation insurance industry was not well developed and not yet able
to provide adequate protection to the airlines in the event of a large damage award.27
The Warsaw Convention sought to balance the differing interests of the pas-
28senger and air carrier. It provided the plaintiff with recovery without the need to
prove the airlines' negligence. 29 It was often a difficult task to prove the airlines'
negligence for a death or injury from an air mishap, but without proof of neglegence
the plaintiff's claim would fail due to insufficient evidence.30 The air carriers interest
of "limited liability" was met by allowing the amount of damages to be capped .
The Warsaw Convention originally established air carrier liability limits for
death and bodily injury of passengers at approximately 125,000 French francs per
22. WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 15, Ch. II, arts. 3-16 (setting forth the uniform standards for
transportation documents in international air travel and shipping); Id. Art. 3 (requiring the ticket to have the place
and date of issue, place of departure and destination, agreed stopping places, name and address of the carrier or
carriers, and a statement that the transportation is subject to the provisions of this Convention).
23. Id. art. 4 (setting forth the requirements of the baggage check); id. arts. 5-16 (setting forth the require-
ments of an air waybill for air cargo).
24. Id art. 19.
25. See generally Grems, supra note 9, at 141-42 (explaining the aviation industry was an infant in 1929);
qf JoHNJ. COYLE ET AL, TRANSPORTATION 192 (4th ed. 1994) (stating Wilbur and Orville Wright made their first
flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina in 1903; and in 1908 the development of air transportation began with the U.S.
Post Office testing and examining the feasibility of providing air mail service).
26. See Pastor, supra note 3, at 576 (discussing the purpose behind the Warsaw Convention); see also Gross,
supra note 21, at 4 (stating a major goal of the Warsaw Convention was to allow the growth of the infant industry
by shielding it with liability limits);'see also Grems supra note 9, at 142 (discussing the airlines had a much higher
accident rate in the late 1920's) From 1925 to 1929 only 400 million passenger miles were flown with a fatality rate
of 45 per 100 million passenger miles flown. Id. Compare this to a fatality rate of 0.55 per 100 million passenger
miles in 1965. Id. Air travel is now generally safe and efficient, but in 1929 it was an adventure. Id
27. See Francis Lyall, The Warsaw Convention-Cutting the Gordian Knot and the 1995 Intercarrier
Agreement, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 67, 68 (1996) (explaining why the aviation insurance industry was
inadequate to protect the aviation industry in the early 1900's due to the potential large claims):
28. See McQuade, supra note 8, at 328 (discussing how these conflicting interests were met by placing a
presumption of liability on the air carrier but limiting the recovery for the passenger).
29. See Lyall, supra note 27, at 69 (discussing the motivating factors that encouraged the various states to
form an international agreement for international air transportation).
30. See id. (stating without proof of negligence the plaintiff's claim would fail). The cause of an aviation
crash is sometimes difficult to prove. Id.
31. See McQuade, supra note 8, at 328.
1997/Liability Limits Under the Warsaw Convention
passenger or US$8,300, with a rebuttable presumption of carrier negligence. 32 How-
ever, this limit was increased in 1955, when parties of the Hague Protocol met to
modify the provisions of the Warsaw Convention. 33 Partly due to inflation, the parties
agreed to double the liability limits of the Warsaw convention to US$16,000. 34 The
Hague Protocol was submitted to the United States Senate for its to ratification in
1964 and 1965.35 It was accompanied by proposed legislation that would have re-
quired air carriers to provide international passengers with an automatic insurance
policy in addition to the amount provided for under the Hague Protocol. 6 Due to the
objections of the automatic insurance policy in the Senate, the Protocol was never put
to a vote, despite the United States' continued efforts to increase the liability limits
of the Warsaw Convention.37
On November 15, 1965, the United States gave notice of denunciation 3 of the
WarsAw Convention, to take effect in May 1966, because its efforts earlier in the year
to raise the limits to US$100,000 had failed. 39 Because the United States accounted
for sixty percent of all international air passengers, its participation in the convention
was essential to its survival.40 The United States position was that the recovery limit
for personal injury or death to international passengers was far too low to adequately
compensate the harmed international passenger.41 Two days before the denunciation
32. Id.; see Gross, supra note 21, at Ib; see also Grems supra note 9, at 142 (explaining the sole official
language of the conference was French, thus resulting in the damages listed in francs).
33. See GESILU, supra note 5, at XV-I (discussing the increase in liability from the original amounts in the
Warsaw Convention).
34. See Warsaw Convention (Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air): Montreal Protocols 3 and 4 Pioviding Higher Liability Limits, Sept. 25. 1975) 22 I.L.M. 13
(discussing the evolution of liability limits under the Warsaw Convention); see also Naneen K. Baden, The
Japanese Initiative on The Warsaw Convention, 61 J. AIR L. & COm. 437,442 (1996) (stating in the United States
recovery in domestic personal injury cases far exceeded the limits created under the Warsaw Convention).
35. See 22 I.L.M. 13, supra nbte 34, at 14 (explaining why the United States did not ratify the Hague
Protocol).
36. See id. (stating the proposed legislation would have required a $50,000 insurance policy with an
additional $10,000 for actual medical expenses).
37. See Gasat, supra note 5, at XV-1; see also 22 I.L.M. 13, supra note 34, at 14 (stating the United States
has taien the lead since the 1950's in seeking an increase in the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention).
38. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990) (defining denounce as the term frequently used in
regard to treaties, indicating the act of one nation in giving notice to another nation of its intention to withdraw from
an existing treaty between the two nations).
39. See Pastor, supra note 3, at 577 (explaining how the increased liability limits under the Montreal
Agreement came about); see also 22 I.L.M. 13, supra note 34, at 14 (discussing the United States reasoning for
giving notice of denunciation); see also Baden, supra note 34, at 444 (citing U.S. Gives Notice of Denunciation
of Warsaw Convention, 53 Dep't. St. Bull. 923, 923-24 (1965)) (stating that the U.S. gave notice of the
denunciation solely because of the low liability limits for death or personal injury provided in the Warsaw
Convention, and that the U.S. stood ready to participate in a convention containing no liability limits for personal
injury or death).
40. See Baden, supra note 34, at 444 (explaining the necessity to have the JATA reach a new agreement with
the United States so as to not allow the U.S. denunciation to take affect).
41. See id. at 441 (explaining that amounts of recovery in U.S. domestic flight personal injury and death
actions far exceeded the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention).
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was to become effective, the Montreal Agreement was reached between the United
States government and the International Air Transport Association [IATA]. 42 As a
result of this agreement the United States withdrew its denunciation in May of
1966.* Consequently, in 1966, fifty-eight United States carriers individually signed
the Montreal Agreement4' relating to the liability limits of the Hague Protocol.45 The
Montreal Agreement is not a treaty, but rather an agreement between international
air carriers, which was approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board.46 The signatory
airlines.agreed to file a special contract with their tariffs, subsequently filed with the
Civil Aeronautics Board, waiving their liability limits under the Warsaw Con-
vention. 47 The airlines agreed to concede liability without fault to all flights
originating, stopping, or terminating in the United States.48 The new liability limit for
all passengers in the United States was set at US$75,000 per passenger, as assumed
by the fifty-eight United States air carriers.49 The airlines agreed to give up the "due
care"50 defense provisions in the original Warsaw Convention in exchange for a
continued limitation of liability.-5
Im. LIABILITY UNDER WARSAW CONVENTION
Limiting liability of the air carrier was the primary subject of the Warsaw
Convention." Representatives from the United States voiced objections to the low
liability limits framed within the Warsaw Convention. 3 The continued efforts to




44. CAB Agreement 18900, approved by Order F-23680, May 13, 1966.
45. See GESE.U, supra note 5, at XV-I (discussing the Montreal Agreement).
46. See Gross, supra note 21, at 12a (explaining that the Montreal Agreement is not a treaty but is a contract
between air carriers approved by the DOT).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See GEsELL, supra note 5, at XV-1.
50. See WARSAW CONVErmoN,supra note 15, ar. 20(1) (providing the carrier shall not be liable if it proves
that all necessary measures to avoid the damage were taken by the carrier and its agents, or that all necessary
measures were impossible to take; see also Pastor, supra note 3 (explaining that the airlines refer to the defense
under art. 20(1) as the due care defense).
51. See Pastor, supra note 3.
52. See GESELL, supra note 5, atXV-1; see also Gross, supra note 21, at 4 (discussing the primary objective
of the Warsaw Convention).
53. See GESELL, supra note 5, at XV-1.
54. See 22 I.LM. 13, supra note 34, at 14 (stating the United States has taken the lead to increase liability
limits); see also GESEL, supra note 5, at XV-1, XU-5 (discussing the United States passengers dissatisfaction with
the low liability limits of the Warsaw Convention, and the governments efforts to pass aviation insurance legislation
to provide passengers with greater amounts of potential recovery for accidents).
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A. Liability Under The Original Provisions of The Warsaw Convention
Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Warsaw Convention define the liability of the air
carier for personal injury to the passenger, for damage or loss of goods and baggage,
and for damage due to delay in transportation." The original provisions of the War-
saw Convention in 1929 limited the liability of the carrier to 125,000 francs, or about
US$8,300 for each passenger. 6 However, Article 25 allows a plaintiff to overcome
these liability limits with a showing that the air carrier was guilty of willful mis-
conduct, thereby removing any limitation on liability.57 This piovision has spawned
litigation in an attempt to provide a greater recovery for the plaintiff.58 Litigating the
"willful misconduct" issue, during which no recovery is available for the plaintiff,
is a lengthy, costly, and uncertain process.5
The provisions in the original Warsaw Convention did not impose absolute
liability upon the airlines.60 Articles 20 and 21 of the Warsaw Convention set forth
affirmative defenses of the airline.6t For instance under Article 20(1), the air carrier
55. See WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 15, art. 17, infra note 56 and accompanying text; see also id.
art. 18 (establishing the liability of the air carrier for loss, destruction or damage of checked baggage or goods); see
also id. art. 19 (establishing the liability of the air carrier for damage occasioned by delay in the air transportation
of passengers, baggage, and goods).
56. Id. art. 17; see id. art. 22(1) (establishing the limit of liability for personal injury); see id. art. 22(2)
(creating the limit of liability for goods or baggage to be 250 French francs per kilogram, approximately US$16.60
per kilogram).
57. See id. art. 25 (establishing the standard of wilful neglect that could defeat the limit of liability).
58. See Baden, supra note 34, at 440 (stating the effect of Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention).
59. See id. (stating the consequence of Article 25 has been a considerable amount of litigation); see also
USA: US Approves IATA Pacts on Passenger Liability, NEW STRAITs TIMES, Jan. 17, 1997 (stating the only way
passengers or their dependants could get a realistic recovery was to go through "willful ihisconduct" litigation,
which was time consuming, costly, distressing and uncertain). See generally Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 872
F.2d 1462 (1 1th Cir.), rev'd499 U.S. 530 (1991) (involving litigation lasting six years to prove that a mechanical
failure constituted "willful misconduct"), In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 807 F. Supp. 1073
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 932 F.2d 1475 (1992) (involving a nine year litigation to prove the
destruction of Flight KE007 by Soviet military aircraft was caused by "willful misconduct" of the crew in flying
off course); hI re In-flight Explosion in TWA, 778 F. Supp. 625 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (involving a five year litigation
to prove the "willful misconduct" of the airline in taking safety precautions), rev'd sub nona. Ospina v. Trans World
Airlines, 975 F.2d 35 (2nd Cir 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1944 (1993).
60. WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 15, art. 20,49 STAT. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25.
61. See id. arts. 20-21.
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would not be held liable for the death or injury of its passengers if it could show that
it had taken all the necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible
to take those measures. 62 Labeled as the "due care" defense,63 it has little practical
significance.6 In almost every crash scenario one could point to something the airline
did or should have done that could have prevented the accident; except for the missile
theory that surfaced in light of the downing of TWA flight 800.65
B. Liability Under The Montreal Agreement
The Montreal Agreement, modifying the Warsaw Convention, applied to all
international air transportation going to, from, or stopping within the United States.6
Under the Montreal Agreement, it was no longer necessary for passengers to over-
come the due care defense of the airlines. 67 The air carriers who participated in this
agreement waived all of their defenses under Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Con-
vention.6' The passengers needed only to prove damages resulting from an accident
that occurred on board, or during the operations of embarking or disembarking the
aircraft. 69 The carriers agreed to accept limited liability in the amount of $75,000,
essentially making the airline strictly liable up to that limit.70 Thus, the airlines con-
tinued to have the considerable benefit of liability limits, and the passengers would
have the benefit of increased potential recovery without the need to prove the normal
elements of a tort action.7' Both passengers and industry continue to have the benefit
of liability limits, possibly reducing insurance costs and the price of fares.72 Article
25 of the Warsaw Convention still applies to the Montreal Agreement, so the carnier
could notlimit its liability to $75,000 if the "willful misconduct '73 clause applied.7'
62. See id. art. 20(1).
63. See Pastor, supra note 3 (stating the airlines call the defense under Article 20(1) the "due care" defense).
64. See generally Kreindler, supra note 6 (explaining that the airlines successfully used the due care defense
only once). In that case, tried by the late Melvin Belli, he pleaded to the jury to give his client more than the limit
of $8,300 or to give him nothing. Id. The jury complied with Mr. Belli and awarded his client nothing. Il
65. IL
66. See 22 I.L.M. 13, supra note 34, at 14 (discussing the applications of the Montreal Agreement).
67. See Pastor, supra note 3, at 577 (discussing the provisions of the Montreal Agreement).
68. See 22 I.L.M. 13, supra note 34, at 14 (discussing the provisions of the Montreal Agreement relating
to liability of the carriers); see also WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 15, art. 20(1) (stating the carrier will not be
liable if he proves that both he and his agents have taken "all necessary provisions to avoid damage" or that it was
impossible to take those measures).
69. See Pastor, supra note 3, at 577 (discussing the Montreal Agreements' basic provisions); see also
WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 15, art. 17.
70. See 22 I.L.M. 13, supra note 34, at 14 (explaining the $75,000 amount is including legal fees and costs);
see also WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 15, art. 17.
71. See Pastor, supra note 3, at 577 (stating the benefit of the Montreal Agreement).
72. Id
73. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529, 533 (1949) (pointing out that "wilfil misconduct"
occurs when there is a deliberate purpose not to discharge some duty required in the interests of safety). In this case
a flight plan was filed for 4000 feet, and there was a mountain that rose to 4090 feet. d There was an air regulation
requiring the airlines to file for an altitude 1000 feet above the highest object within 5 miles of the course line. Id
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C. United States Case Law Interpreting Liability Under the Warsaw
Convention
The Warsaw Convention does not create a cause of action for plaintiffs who
suffer damages resulting from an air accident.75 The Warsaw Convention only creates
a presumption of liability, when and if the relevant law provides for a cause of action
for the injuries or damage alleged.7 6 It then establishes a maximum limit on the
potential liability of an air carrier for injuries sustained by a passenger or damage to
baggage or goods being shipped as a result of an accident involving international air
transport.7 7 The Supreme Court has interpreted Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention 8 to permit compensatory damages for legally cognizable harm.7 9 The War-
saw Convention leaves the specifications of what harm is legally recognizable to the
domestic law of the forum.80 U.S. courts have not allowed for recovery of punitive
damages under Article 17.8
The plane crashed into a mountain at an elevation of 3910 feet. Id. The court found that the airlines misconduct in
planning the flight arose to the level of k~illful misconduct. Id. Thus the limits of liability under the Warsaw
Convention did not apply to the crash. Id. See David Lyons, American Ruled Guilty In Jet Crash, THE Fr. WoRTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 12, 1997, at 1 (discussing the recent summary judgement ruling of a federal district judge
finding American Airlines guilty of "willful misconduct" in the crash of a Boeing 757 near Cali, Columbia in
December 1995).'Judge Marcus stated that a reasonable jury would have to conclude that it was willful misconduct
to continue a descent at night in mountainous terrain when the plane was off course. Id. American argued that they
were negligent but that it did not rise to a level of willful misconduct. Id.
74. See 22 I.L-M. 13, supra note 34,-at 14 (discussing how the carrier could not avail itself of the limits of
liability if the Warsaw Conventions' art. 25 applies); see also WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 15, art. 25 (stating
a carrier cannot use the liability limits to shield it from liability due to the carriers "willful misconduct").
75. See Gross, supra note 21, at 4 (explaining the well established, but sometimes criticized principle of the
Warsaw Convention).
76. See id.
77. See id. See generally Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991), Pan Am World Airways v.
Johnson Controls World Servs., 16 F.3d 513 (2d Cir. 1994), In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983,932
F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991), In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th
Cir. 1981), Beaudet v. British Airways, 853 F. Supp 1062 (N.D. I1. 1994) (where the courts have used the willful
misconduct standard to award compensatory damages).
78. See WARSAWCONVENION, supra note 15, art. 17, supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing
the liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention).
79. See Zicherman, et al. v. Korean Air Lines Co. 116 S. Ct. 629, 133 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1996) (holding that
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention permits compensation for only legally recognizable harm).
80. See id. (holding the Warsaw Convention leaves the specifics about the legal harm to the law of the
forum).
81. See In Re Air Disaster atLockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 920
(1991) (holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under the Warsaw Convention); see also i Re Korean
AirLines Disasterof Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1474 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991) (holding punitive
damages are excluded by the Warsaw Convention).
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IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION
On January 8, 1997, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) issued an
order8 2 approving IATA's two agreements, and the Air Transport Agreement 3
(ATA) on international air carrier liability for passengers."' These recent agreements
between the airlines will essentially eliminate liability limits under the Warsaw
Convention.8 The airlines agreed not to apply any fixed limits of liability, which cur-
rently range from US$75,000 in the United States to US$150,000 in most of Europe,
and US$350,000 in Australia.
8 6
A. Agreements Affecting the Liability Under the Warsaw Convention
Because the international communities failed to agree on an amendment in-
creasing the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention, the international carriers took
it upon themselves to change the liability scheme.87 Article 22(1) of the Warsaw
Convention allows for the carrier to agree to a higher limit of liability, thus making
it legal for the carriers to waive or increase the limits without abolishing the con-
vention. s The fact that the United States had not reached any agreement to raise the
liability limits under the Warsaw Convention raised the possibility that it could once
again denounce the treaty, leading to its demise if the U.S. withdrew. 89 The carriers
reasoned it was better to agree to a higher liability, thus ensuring the survival of the
Warsaw Convention. 9 The Warsaw Convention provides stability and uniformity as
to the kind of damages available to claimants, and provides a legal framework to
82. See DOT Order 97-1-2; see also DOT Order 95-7-15 at 3(f) (requiring that any agreement reached must
be submitted to the Department for approval before its implementation).
83. See Kreindler, supra note 6 (explaining that the ATA is the trade association for US flag carriers).
84. See European News Brief, AIRuNE FIN. NEws, Jan. 20, 1997 (explaining that IATA won approval from
the US DOT to implement their two agreements); see also Kreindler, supra note 6 (discussing the two IATA
agreements); infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text (discussing the Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger
Liability); infra notes 107-18 and accompanying text (discussing the Agreement on Measures to Implement the
IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
85. See Lyall, supra note 27, at 77 (1996) (discussing the affect of the intercarrier agreement on the Warsaw
Convention).
86. See US Approves IATA Pacts on Passenger Liability, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 17, 1997, at 2
(discussing the United States approval of the TATA Intercarrier Agreement); see also Intercarrier Agreement on
Passenger Liability Explanatory Note (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that the signatory
carriers agree to waive the various liability limits set forth in the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, the
Montreal Agreement, and any other previously agreed limits).
87. See Rod D. Margo, Practical Implications of the IATA Initiative on the Warsaw Convention-A Defense
Perspective 4, 4-6 (Jan. 23, 1997) (unpublished paper presented at the Tenth Annual Aviation Law/Insurance
Symposium in Daytona Beach, Fla.) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining the surrounding
conditions which led to the formation of the inter-carrier agreements).
88. See WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 15, art. 22(1) (providing that the carrier may agree to a higher
liability limit by a special contract).
89. See Margo, supra note 87, at 4.
90. See id. at 5.
1997/Liability Limits Under the Warsaw Convention
avoid many of the jurisdictional and conflicts of law problems that would be
involved in international air transport. 9' Without the agreement in place the carriers
would have to litigate many issues that are settled in the Warsaw scheme. 92
1. The Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability
At IATA's annual general meeting on October 30, 1995 the representatives of
the six regions unanimously adopted an inter-airline agreement, named the Inter-
carrier Agreement on Passenger Liability (HA), to waive liability limits under the
Warsaw Convention for passenger injury and death.' This agreement is an inter-
airline agreement which makes it effective in most countries without any govern-
mental involvement.' The signatory airlines9 of the IA agreed t6 take action to
waive the liability limitations on recoverable compensatory damages 96 under Article
22, paragraph 1 of the Warsaw Convention.' The international air carriers asserted
that the Warsaw Convention was of great benefit to international air travel, but that
its' liability limits are now grossly inadequate.9 The airlines state they are acting to
increase the limits to benefit the passengers.99
The signatory airlines agreed to make two essential points part of their contract
between the passenger and the airline.St° The first point being that in international air
travel, there shall be no liability limitation on compensatory damages.'' The second
point is the compensatory damages will be awarded according to the law of the pas-
91. d.
92. Id.
93. See Lyall, supra note 27, at 67 (discussing the origins of the Intercarrier Agreement of 1995).
94. See id. at 77 (discussing the affect of the intercarrier agreement); see Order 96-11-06, at I (discussing
the TATA requests approval of the agreements from the U.S. DOT and a grant of antitrust immunity with respect
to the agreements).
95. See Inter-carrier Agreement on Passenger Liability [hereinafter IIA] (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (listing 77 signatory airlines as of Nov. 25, 1996, some of whom include: Aeromexico, Air
Canada, Air France, Air New Zealand, Alaska Airlines, American Airlines, British Airways, Continental Airlines,
Delta Airlines, Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Japan Airlines Co. Ltd., Northwest Airlines, Quantas Airways Limited,
USAir Inc., UPS Airlines, etc.); see also Carriers May See Skyrocketing Insurance Premiums, AIRUNE FINANCIAL
NEws, Oct 14, 1996, Vol. 11, No. 40 (discussing IATA's spokesman Tim Goodyear's comments that IATA had
seventy signatures on their agreement, representing over half the passenger transport in the world).
96. See BLACK'S LAW DICTINARY 390 (6th ed. 1990) (defining compensatoiy damages as damages
awarded to a person as compensation or restitution for harm or injury suffered or sustained). The rationale behind
compensatory damages is to restore the injured party person to the position he or she was in prior to the injury Id.
97. See Kreindler, supra note 6 (discussing the IIA and its provisions); see also Lyall, supra note 27, at 76
(discussing the 1995 solution to liability problem was the IATA IIA); IIA, supra note 95, at I 1 (stating the
undersigned agree to waive the liability limits of Article 22, paragraph I of the Warsaw Convention for claims of
death or bodily injury of a international passenger within the meaning of Article 17 of the Convention).
98. See IIA, supra note 95.
99. See id.
100. See Lyall, supra note 27, at 77 (explaining the 1995 IIA and the changes it makes, to the Warsaw
Convention for the airlines who agree to sign it).
101. See id. (discussing the two fundamental principles established by the IIA that apply to the signatory
airlines).
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 10
senger's domicile.'02 The new agreement does not affect the validity of the provisions
of the Warsaw Convention other than the liability limits under Article 22(1) of the
Convention.103 However, a carrier has the option to waive any defense under the
Warsaw Convention up to a specified monetary amount of recoverable damages) t"
Under the IIA, carriers continue to have a right to contribution or indemnity from a
third party.105 The remaining provisions still are in effect, thus providing stability and
continuity within the international air transport system.'
6
2. Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement
The second agreement formulated by IATA in 1996 is the Agreement on
Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement (MIA). °' The carriers who
sign onto the MIA agree to incorporate the provisions of the agreement into their
conditions of carriage and tariffs.Ins This enables the agreement to become part of the
airlines' contract with the passenger. The MIA, like the IIA, states that the carrier
will not invoke the liability limits available under the.Warsaw Convention Article
22(1) for recoverable compensatory damages falling under Article 17'09 of the
Warsaw Convention." ° The MIA requires that the carrier not assert any defenses
available under Article 20(1)"' of the Warsaw Convention up to 100,000 Special
102. See hA, supra note 95, at cl. 1 (providing that damages are to be awarded according to the passenger's
domicile); see also Lyall, supra note 27, at 76-77 (explaining the second principle of the IIA will eliminate forum
shopping). Under the Warsaw Convention prior to the HA, plaintiffs would forum shop to find a forum that would
award the greatest damages. Id. The purpose of tort law is to compensate the victim, not to provide him with a
windfall. Id.
103. See Lyall, supra note 27, at 77 (discussing the IIA will not affect the validity of the Warsaw Convention
except for the elimination of the liability limits and the adding of the passengers domicile).
104. See IIA, supra note 95, at el. 2. (providing the carrier with the option to waive any defense up to a
certain amount).
105. Seeid.,atcl. 3.
106. See Lyall, supra note 27, at 77; see also Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability Explanatory Note
(copy on file with Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that the defenses under the Warsaw Convention will still be
available to the carrier unless he decides to waive them or is required to do so by a governmental authority).
107. See Kreindler supra note 6 (discussing the MIA and its provisions); see also Agreement on Measures
to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement [hereinafter MIA] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
108. See MIA, supra note 107, § I.
109. See WAmsAwCoNvENoN,supra note 15, art. 17 (providing a carrier will be liable for a death or injury
sustained by a passenger if the accident occurred while on board the aircraft or while in the process of embarking
or disembarking the aircraft).
110. See MIA supra note 107, § I(l).
111. See WARSAWCONVENtION,supra note 15, art. 20(1) (asserting a carrier will not be liable if he has taken
all measures to avoid the accident, or it was impossible for him to do so); see Kreindler, supra note 6 (stating the
only possible way an airline could show that it took all necessary measures to prevent an accident would be the
missile theory raised by the downing of TWA 800). There has only been one case where the airline successfully
raised the Article 20(1) defense. Id. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing the defense available
under Article 20(1) of the Convention).
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Drawing Rights..2 (SDR).n 3 This provision differs slightly from the HA in that it
allowed the carier the option of waiving any defense up to a certain amount.' 4 The
IIA neither named the defense to be waived, nor the amount up to which it was
waived." s The MIA gives the carrier the option of the passenger's domicile as a
forum for litigation." 6 The MIA also gives the carrier the option to limit the waiver
to specific routes."17 The MIA has been signed by 46 carriers." s
3. Provisions Implementing the IATA Intercarrier Agreement to be
Included in Conditions of Carriage and Tariffs
There is also a third agreement approved by the DOT that was formulated by the
Air Transport Association (ATA) in 1996, called the Provisions Implementing the
IATA Intercarrier Agreement to be Included in Conditions of Carriage and Tariffs
(IPA).1 9 American flag carriers have also signed onto this agreement, however no
IATA carrier has signed it. 20 The ATA's IPA differs from the IATA's MIA in
several ways.'2' The first difference is there is no option of specific routes to waive
the defense under Article 20(1) of the Convention." A second difference is the
application of the law of the passenger's domicile is not optional under the IPA.'2
A third difference is the IPA includes a specific notice provision for withdrawal from
the Montreal Agreement with a substitution of the IPA in all DOT regulations and
orders referring to the Montreal Agreement. 24 The IPA also includes a provision to
112. See Kreindler, supra note 6 (discussing SDR's as worth approximately US$140,000 today); see also
Order 96-10-7, at I (estimating 100,000 SDR's at approximately US$145,000); see also MONTREAL PROTOCOL 1,
art 2 (changing the expression of liability limits under the Warsaw Convention from French Francs to Special
Drawing Rights).
113. See MIA, supra note 107, § 1(2) (discussing the defense of Article 20(1) will not be used up to 100,000
SDRs unless the option in MIA § 11(2) is used). The option allows a carrier to limit the waiver to specific amounts
and for specific routes as authorized by governments, when the carrier exercises this option and places the routes
and amounts in the MIA. Iil
114. See 11A, supra note 95, at cl. 2; see also MIA supra note 107, § 1(2).
115. See MIA, supra note 107, § 1(2).
116. See id. § H(1) (stating the recoverable compensatory damages may be determined by the passengers
domicile or permanent residence if included in the carriers conditions of carriage and tariffs); see also Kreindler
supra note 6 (stating that the MIA differs from the HA in that the passengers domicile is an option for the forum
and not a requisite).
117. See id. § H(2).
118. See id. (stating that as of Nov. 25,1996 there were 46 signatory carriers; some of which include: Alaska
Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Continental Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines, United Airlines).
119. See Kreindler, supra note 6 (discussing the third inter-airline agreement to waive liability limits
proposed by the ATA); see also Order 97-1-2.
120. See Kreindler, supra note 6, at 2 (listing the various agreements and their signatories).
121. See Order 96-11-6, at 2 (explaining the ATAs IPA and its differences from the IATAs agreements).
122. See id. (explaining the ATA's IPA does not include the option under the IATA MIA § 11(2)); see supra
notes 115-17 and accompanying text (discussing the option in the MIA § H(2)).
123. See Order 96-11-6, at 2 (explaining the IPA does not have an option of using the forum of the passengers
domicile as under the MIA § 1I(l), but requires-the airline to use the passengers dbmicile as the appropriate forum).
124. See id.
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encourage other carriers to become parties to the HA, MIA, and the IPA
agreements.12s
4. Summary of the Inter-Carrier Agreements
The existence of the three intercarrier agreements is confusing, and is made more
so by the fact that the airlines refer to these as a single agreement.126 The three
agreements all provide: (1) a carrier shall not invoke the liability limits in Article
22(1) of the Convention for any recoverable compensatory damages arising under
Article 17 of the Convention, and (2) the carrier will not avail itself of any defenses
under Article 20(1) of the Convention to that portion of the claim less than 100,000
SDRs.127 Thus, carriers will be strictly liable for the compensatory damages up to
approximately US$145,000, and further can limit their liability beyond this amount
by showing they took all necessary measures to avoid the accident.12 1 An airline
would be hard pressed to show it took all necessary measures to avoid an accident;
usually, there is something that could have or should have been done to avoid an
accident.1 29 An example of an unavoidable accident that would most likely be
conducive to an Article 20(1) defense would be the missile theory which has surfaced
in the downing of TWA Flight 800. 30
5. Approval of the Inter-Carrier Agreements in the United States
The DOT's action in issuing Order 97-1-2 and approving the HIA, MIA and IPA
pendente lite,131 was the result of a thirty year effort by the IATA and the Air
Transport Association (ATA) to change the liability limits under the Warsaw
Convention. 132 Order 97-1-2 was issued to clarify an earlier order, 96-11-6, issued
by the DOT.
33
The DOT's approval process began on July 31, 1996 when the IATA and the
ATA requested approval of their respective agreements and a grant of antitrust
immunity with respect to those agreements. 134 The DOT then issued an Order to
Show Cause, Order 96-10-7, that tentatively approved the three agreements, and
125. See id
126. See Kreindler, supra note 6 (discussing the difficulty in determining the differences of the three
agreements, compounded by the fact they are often referred to as a single agreement).
127. See Order 97-1-2 (issued on Jan. 8, 1997, approving the lIA, MIA, and the IPA).
128. See id. at4 (explaining the decision of the DOT in regards to the three agreements).
129. See generally Kreindler, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining that there has only been one U.S. case where an
airline successfully asserted an Article 20(1) defense).
130. See id.
131. Pending final action.
132. See DOTGives Tentative Nod To WaiverofPassenger Liability Limits, AV. DAILY, Oct. 7, 1996, at Vol.
326, No. 5, 35 (explaining the tentative agreement by the DOT and airlines).
133. See Order97-1-2, at 1 (modifying Order 96-11-6).
134. See Order 96-11-6.
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opened a discussion period relating to the conditions that would apply to the
approval.1
35
a. DOT Order 96-10-7
The DOT issued Order 96-10-7 on October 3, 1996, tentatively approving the
three agreements subject to certain conditions.'3 The proposed conditions were: (1)
the optional provision of the MIA applying the law of the passenger's domicile be
made mandatory for operations to, from, or with a connection in the U.S.; (2) the
agreements' optional provision for less than 100,000 SDR's, strict liability on
particular routes could not apply to any operations to, from, or through the U.S.; (3)
the waiver of liability must be applicable on a system wide basis; (4) with respect to
transportation to and from the U.S., the waiver would apply to any ticket purchased
on an airline party to the agreements, even if on an interline carrier not party to the
agreements; and (5) the waiver of the limit is inapplicable for social agencies and
Article 20(1) carrier defense of proof of non-negligence shall not apply to U.S.
agencies. The DOT desired to make participation in the agreements mandatory for
operation in the U.S."~ The DOT also sought a so-called fifth jurisdiction, whereby,
the carrier would be subject to the jurisdiction of the domicile or permanent residence
of the passenger. 39 IATA, the ATA, and other interested parties were directed to
show cause why the DOT should not make their findings final.
40
IATA and several foreign airlines and associations filed briefs in opposition to
the Show Cause order.'4' The DOT was criticized for its' attempt to force the carrier
to accept the fifth jurisdiction; it was argued that such an attempt exceeded the
jurisdiction of the DOT and it was in violation of Article 32142 of the Warsaw
Convention.
43
135. See Order 96-10-11.
136. See Order 96-10-7.
137. See id. at 5-6.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 7-8 (discussing the fifth jurisdiction, called this because the Warsaw Convention limits
jurisdiction to (1) the carrier's place of incorporation, Z2) principal place of business, (3) the place where the ticket
was purchased, (4) the destination). Thus the passenger's domicile or permanent residence was the fifth jurisdiction.
Id.
140. See i at 8.
141. See Order 96-11-6 at 2-3 (stating that various opposition briefs were filed including those by: Korean
Air Lines, Swissair, Kuwait Airlines, Lufthansa, Gulf Air, the Aerospace Industries Association).
142. See WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 15, art. 32 (making any agreement attempting to alter the rules
of jurisdiction null and void).
143. See Order 96-11-6 at 3; see also Margo, supra note 87, at 7.
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b. DOT Order 96-11-6
Following many objections to the conditions proposed in the Show Cause
Order,'4" the DOT issued order 96-11-6 on November 12, 1996 approving, pendente
lite, the HA, MIA and IPA Agreements. t45 The approval was subject to the following
conditions: (1) the MIA's option of application of the law of the domicile be required
for operations to, from or with a connecting or stopping place in the U.S.; (2) the
MIA's optional provision for less than 100,000 SDR's on certain routes could not
apply to any operations to, from, stopping, or connecting in the U.S.; (3) carriers
could not exclude U.S. social agencies from the waiver of the limits of liability and
Article 20(1) carrier defense of non-negligence; and (4) the IPA's provision for
withdrawal from the Montreal Agreement would not be effective at this time.
146
While the issuance of this order clearly showed the DOT had addressed some of
the objections to the Show Cause Order, 47 it raised new issues upon which
objections could be made.148 The order did not allow for the withdrawal from the
Montreal Agreement; thus, it created a conflict because the agreements provided the
carrier could use the Warsaw Convention's Article 20(1) defense above 100,000
SDR's. 49 Ultimately, the order allowed the inter-carrier agreements and the Montreal
agreement to conflict on the issue of the availability of the Article 20(1) defense.
c. DOT Order 97-1-2
On December 20, 1996, IATA filed a petition for reconsideration of Order 96-
11-6.15 IATA urged the DOT to drop the requirement of the passenger's domicile
condition because the non-U.S. carriers would not agree to this requirement, thus
threatening the survival of the waivers of liability limits.' 5'
The DOT agreed to reconsider their order, and upon reconsideration, modified
the order by removing their first and fourth conditions of Order 96-11-6. '52 The first
condition that the DOT removed was the requirement of the passenger's domicile,
allowing the non-U.S. carriers to support the order. The fourth condition removed
144. Order 96-10-7.
145. See Order 96-11-6 at 1.
146. Id.
147. Order 96-10-7.
148. See generally Order 96-11-6, at 3 (stating fundamental objections to the department's authority to
impose agreements or waivers upon foreign carriers led the DOT to put aside these issues for more consideration);
see also Margo supra note 87, at 9.
149. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (denying authority to withdraw from the Montreal
Agreement); notes 127-28 and accompanying text (providing that the carrier may use the Article 20(1) defense
above 100,000 SDR's); Pastor, supra note 3, supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (explaining that under the
Montreal Agreement the carriers gave up their Article 20(1) defense).
150. See Order 97-1-2, at 2.
151. See id
152. See id. at 1.
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was denial of the replacement of the Montreal Agreement, thus eliminating the
confusion over the Article 20(1) defense.1
53
DOT Order 97-1-2 allows for the airlines' implementation of the Intercarrier
Agreements by filing tariffs with the DOT.V ' The DOT ruled carriers who file tariffs
which adhered to the mandatory provisions of the MIA would be permitted to with-
draw from the 1966 Montreal Agreement. 55 The DOT granted a further discussion
period through June 30, 1998 to discuss some of the Departments concerns.1
5 6
The new agreements eliminate the need for the passenger to prove "willful
misconduct" to defeat the liability limits. t57 The airlines will have unlimited liability
unless they can prove they were not negligent.'58 The carrier may limit its liability
to 100,000 SDRs if it can prove it had taken all possible actions to avoid the
accident. 59 Thus the carrier will be strictly liable for claims up to 100,000 SDR's.1
t6
0
B. Effect of the Change on Airlines
The airlines are not forced to participate in the removal of the liability limits
under the Warsaw Convention; they voluntarily accept the limits by filing tariffs with
the DOT.'61 The airlines will now need to consider whether they will sign onto the
inter-carrier agreements, and file tariffs with the DOT as outlined in Order 97-1-2.61
Several U.S. airlines have already filed tariffs implementing the agreement with the
153. Id.
154. See Order 97-1-2.
155. Md (stating that the tariffs must state: (1) the carrier shall not invoke the limitation of liability in Article
22(l) of the Convention as to any claim for recoverable compensatory damages arising under Article 17 of the
Convention; (2) the carrier shall not avail itself on any defense under Article 20(1) of the Convention with respect
to that portion of such claim which does not exceed 100,000 SDRs on operation to, from, or with a connection or
stopping place in the United States; and (3) except as otherwise provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the carrier
reserves all defenses available under the Convention to any such claim. With respect to third parties, the carrier also
reserves all rights of recourse against any other person, including without limitation, rights of contribution and
indemnity).
156. See id. at 1.
157. See Carriers May See Skyrocketing lnsurance Premuunts, AIR1INEFIN. NEws, Oct. 14,1996 (explaining
the burden of proof has shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant).
158. See id. (explaining that the liability will now be unlimited except for the defense of Article 20(1) of the
Convention, the defense of "all necessary measures"); see supra notes 50-51 (discussing the defense under Article
20(l) of the Convention).
159. See Kreindler, supra note 6 (stating this is only a technical limitation since it has only been a successful
defense in one case). The effect is absolute liability. Id. See DOT Order Should Encourage Airlines To Waive
Liability Limits, AIR SAFETY WEEK, Jan. 20, 1997 (stating filing tariffs with the DOT will allow airlines to rid
themselves of liability limits and apply strict liability to that portion of the claim not exceeding 100,000 SDR's).
160. See Order 97-1-2, at 4.
161. See generally Order 97-1-2; see also Kreindler supra note 6, at 3 (discussing the fact that the agreement
is basically contract and not law).
162. See Margo, supra note 87, at 11 (stating that airlines that accept the mandatory terms of the MIA will
have to file tariffs in the prescribed form withdrawing them from the Montreal Agreement, those carriers not
accepting the mandatory terms will have to fileproposed tariffs with the DOT following the guidelines in Order
97-1-2).
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DOT, some of which include: American Airlines, American Eagle, Delta Air Lines,
United Airlines and USAir.' The airlines will-also need to update their ticket stock
to reflect the changes in the liability scheme affecting the passenger.'6 The fact that
the waiver of limits is basically accomplished by contract creates some interesting
legal questions that remain unanswered. For example, can a manufacturer of an
aircraft or a component be forced to pay contribution or indemnification based
primarily on a contract among the airlines?' Or could the manufacturer claim that
the airline was a mere volunteer in its payment above the US$75,000 limit under the
Montreal Agreement, and refuse to indemnify or contribute any damages paid above
that limit?' 66 These questions will have to be worked out, but illustrate the need for
further refinement in the area of liability.
Air carriers could face increasing insurance premiums to deal with a greater
potential liability due to the waiver of liability limits in international aviation
disasters. 67 The chairman of the Aviation Insurance Offices' Association (AIOA),
which represents the London-based insurance companies market, said it is impossible
to quantify the exact increase the insurance industry could face in passenger liability
claims, but estimates the increase at $300 million annually.t68 The chairman stated
insurers will likely try to increase airlines' premiums when the policies renew, but
this may prove difficult given the present state of the aviation insurance market.169
The airlines and their insurance carriers will have to work out new rates or determine
if the present rates are adequate to cover the increased potential liability of the
airlines.
C. Effect of the Change on the Air Traveler
The international air traveler will most likely face an increase in ticket prices and
an increase in shipping prices to cover the increased cost of insurance for the
airlines.170 The passenger will not likely notice any other changes as a result of the
new agreements, unless he or she has the unfortunate experience of being injured in
163. See U.S. Carriers Implementig Agreements Waiving International Liability Limits, DOT NEWS (Feb.
7,1997) <hup'/www.dot.gov/affairs/dot1797.htm> (listing the other carriers that have filed tariffs including: AMR
Combs, Continental Micronesia, Hawaiian Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Tower Air, Trans World Airlines).
164. See Margo, supra note 87, at 11 (explaining that the notice on the tickets may have to be altered).
165. See generally Kreindler supra note 6, at 3-4 (discussing the troubling details of the agreements).
166. Id.
167. See Carriers May See Skyrocketing Insurance Premiun supra note 157 (quoting Lawrence Brinker,
an attorney in the Washington D.C. aviation group, Patton Boggs, LL.P., as saying "any time an at carrier could
be more liable for an event, insurance premiums will go up").
168. See Christopher Adams, Insurers Warn Airlines Over Disaster Rules Call to Keep Compensation Limits,
THE FIN. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1997, at 7 (discussing the calculations of Mr. Barry Wilkes, of AIOA, of the impact on
the insurance industry if most of the world's airlines adopt the new waiver of liability limits).
169. See id (discussing the potentiality of the insurers extracting increases in premiums). Rates for aviation
insurance have fallen in recent years due to excess capacity from several years of healthy profits. Id
170. See generally id.
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an accident. If an accident occurs, the passenger or his or her heirs would be greatly
effected by the agreement, in that there would be no cap on their recoverable
damages if the airline was found negligent, and the airline would be strictly liable for
damages up to US$145,000. t' t
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGE IN LIABILITY
The new agreement relating to liability of an air carrier involved in an accident
while engaging in international air transportation has long been needed.'72 The
amount of $75,000 liability was set in 1966 and has not increased with inflation.'
73
The $75,000 limit on a plaintiff's damages is far too low to adequately compensate
the injured parties in most aviation accidents, and is not commensurate with present
recoveries in non Warsaw accidents.' 74
The plaintiff will now have a better opportunity to receive a more accurate
compensation for his or her damages without having to litigate the issue of willful
neglect.175 In the past, under the old provisions of the Warsaw Convention and the
Montreal Agreement, the plaintiff would have to prove willful neglect to collect
greater damages. 76 This was a difficult and costly litigation hurdle to overcome. 1
77
Under the new system, the plaintiff will no longer need to litigate the willful
neglect issue, wasting precious litigation dollars to obtain a higher judgement.'
78
The air carrier industry will not likely suffer from this new agreement. The
International Air Transport Association, who sought this agreement would certainly
171. See Kreindler, supra note 6, at 2 (explaining the effect of the agreement on liability, and that prior to
the agreement the passengers damages were limited to $75,000, unless willful misconduct was found).
172. See US Approves 1ATA Pacts on Passenger Liability, supra note 86 (stating the liability limits under
the Warsaw convention have been inadequate and unsustainable for many years).
173: See Helen R. Macleod, Airlines Agree to Lift Liability Cap on Flights; Higher Preniuns "not the
issue," J. COM., Feb. 11, 1997, at 8a (discussing the approval of the IATA interc'drrier agreement).
174. See European News Brief, AIRuNFIN. NEWS, Jan. 20, 1997 (explaining that for many years the liability
limits for passengers injured or killed in international air disasters have been inadequate); see Pastor, supra note
3 and accompanying text (stating the average recovery for death in an air crash is $750,000).
175. See Macleod, supra note 173 (discussing the way in which a plaintiff could recover unlimited damages
under the old provisions of the Warsaw Convention); see also European News Brief, supra note 174 (discussing
the liability limits under the Warsaw Convention led to hundreds of lawsuits against the airlines over the wilful
neglect issue).
176. See Macleod, supra note 173 (discussing the way in which a plaintiff could recover unlimited damages
under the old provisions of the Warsaw Convention).
177. See European News Brief, supra note 174 (explaining that the liability limiis led to hundreds of law suits
which dragged on for many years); see also US Approves IATA Pacts on Passenger Liability, Bus. TIMEs, Jan. 17,
1997 (explaining attaining higher limits under the Warsaw Convention proved expensive, time consuming and
uncertain).
178. See European News Brief, supra note 174 (discussing the liability limits under the Warsaw Convention
led to hundreds of lawsuits against the airlines over the wilful neglect issue). The lawsuits often lasted for many
years. Id. See US Approves JATA Pacts on Passenger Liability, supra note 177 (asserting in many cases involving
international air disasters, the plaintiffs had to sue for serious negligence, in order to bypass the liability limits and
attain higher damages). This process was often time consuming and expensive for the plaintiff. Id.
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not form an agreement that was detrimental to its members. The concerns that existed
in 1929, which resulted in the formation of liability limits, no longer exist. The
aviation industry is now deeply entrenched in the transportation world and is no
longer an infant industry. It no longer needs the protection of limited liability to
assure its survival because it is now well financed.1 79 Air transport is now much safer
than it was in 1929 when the original convention for limited liability convened. 80
Because of the increased safety, the industry is now able to get insurance for an air
disaster at a much better rate. The business is in a much better position to insure itself
for the expenses of litigation than in the past.18 ' Airline ticket prices may have to
increase a little for the necessary increase of insurance, but the increase will be most
likely passed on to passengers when purchasing tickeis.
The air transport business is one where public sentiment is of great importance.
With the recent crash of TWA Flight 800 and the large amount of publicity sur-
rounding the event, the public was upset at the potential low liability limits under the
international agreements. The image of the air transport industry can only be




The IATA agreements and the ATA agreement bring to a close the more than
thirty year battle to increase the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention. While the
agreements do not solve all of the questions under the Convention, and in fact raise
a few new ones, the agreements do allow for more realistic awards of damages and
keep the Convention's other aspects alive. The full effect of the agreements on the
airlines remains to be seen.
ICAO and the airlines do not intend to stop working on the issue of improving
the Warsaw Convention. A new convention has been proposed to all member nations
to make into law some of the agreements reached, and to improve upon the Warsaw
179. See Baden, supra note 34, at 439 (1996) (discussing that the airline industry no longer requires limited
liability).
180. See Grems, supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the airlines safety records).
181. See Baden, supra note 34, (explaining the airline industry no longer requires the limited liability due
to its development); see also Robert Evans, Airlines Chiefs to Scan Industry Outlook in Geneva, REUTERS N. AM.
WIRE, Nov. 3, 1996 (reporting the 250 plus airlines who belong to IATA, who account for 98% of all international
scheduled flights, were heading for healthy profits again in 1996). 1996 was the third year in a row that the
members have reported record profits. Id.
182. See Macleod, supra note 173, at 8a (explaining that airlines can now hold their heads up and be proud
of this agreement).
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Convention in general. The future is not clear as to what their efforts will bring, but
given the fact that it has taken thirty years to remove liability limits initially designed
to be temporary, the change will not likely take place quickly. But some of the
questions raised by these new agreements illustrate the need for a law-based system
governing international accidents rather than a contract-based system.
